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The cost of stabilization in chronic-inflation couLntries  is highi,
whether it is paid up front (with fiscal shock) or delayed (in
exchange-rate-based stabilization).  And eliminating the fiscal
deficit is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for controlling
intlation. The breaking of inertia calls for a coordination device
in the transition toward price stability
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This paper evaluates  Chile's  stabilization  policies  since  the early
1970s. Four  episodes  are  examined:  (1)  the  high inflation  at the  beginning  bf
the  military  regime  when inflation  was close  to 1000  percent  per  year; (2)  the
orthodox  stabilization  program  of  1975;  (3)  the  exchange  rate-based  stabilization
of  February  1978-June  1982;  and,  (4)  the  post-1984  adjustment  period  with  a large
real  devaluation  and  low  inflation. Finally  an overall  evaluation  of the  post-
1973  experience  with stabilization  is  provided.
Chile  has  had  a  long  history  of  inflation.  In  the  1960s,  a  period  when
government  policy  aimed  to  validate  the  inertia  inflation  that  was  resulting  from
the  periodic  wage  and  exchange  rate  increases  (Cauas  1970),  inflation  reached  an
average  of  21.12  per  year. In  the  early  1970s,  following  the  socialist-populist
policies  of the Allende government,  in spite of widespread  price controls
inflation  accelerated  reaching  558X  per  year  in  August  1973,  the  month  before  the
military  coup  that  deposed  Allende. The  military  government  thus  had  to  contend
with  an  economy  suffering  from  the  worst  inflation  in  Chile's  history  as  well  as
from  widespread  distortions  and  major  macroeconomic  imbalances.  With  a public
sector  deficit  close  to  302  of  GDP,  financed  mostly  through  the  printing  of  money
the real demand  for money was shrinking  and inflation  accelerating  despite
extensive  price  controls.
In its  initial  years  the  military  government  attacked  the  inflation  by
controlling  the  growth  of the  money supply  through  a drastic  reduction  in the
public  sector  deficit. In  spite  of  that  reduction,  however,  inflation  continued
at the  three-digit  level  well  into  early  1977. A key  question  is  why inflation
took so long to drop  below the  three-digit  level,  given  the  very significant
reduction  in the public sector  deficit.  In February  1978, the governments
responded  to 'he situation  by introducing  a preannounced  devaluation  schedule2
(tablita),  wi-h the  devaluations  to  proceed  at decreasing  rates  much below  the
difference  between  domestic  and  foreign  inflation. By June  1979,  it fixed  the
exchange  rate.
Three  basic  objectives  underlay  this  new policy.  First,  in a small
country  such  as  Chile,  which  by  then  had  lowered  its  trade  tariffs  substan:ially,
a slowdown  in the  rate  of devaluation  was supposed  to reduce  the  expected  cate
of inflation. Second,  the  new system  was expected  to put  downward  pressure  on
the  rate  of increase  in  the  price  of tradeable  go-s.  Third,  it  was to lead  to
a further  integration  of the domestic  and international  capital  markets  and
reduce  domestic  interest  rates  by lowering  the  expected  rate  of devaluation.
The authorities  thought  that  the  new policy  was fully  credible,  given
that the fiscal  deficit  had been transformed  into a surplus.  Contrary  to
expectations,  however,  Chile's inflation  remained  higher than international
inflation  for  over  two  years,  and  the  resultant  substantial  real  appreciation  of
the  peso  reached  close  to 302  by the  end  of 1981. The  question  then  became  why
it  took  so  long  for  domestic  inflation  to  converge  with  international  inflation.
Furthermore,  in  spite  of financial  liberalization  and  the  opening  of  the  capital
account,  real  interest  rates  averaged  around  50  2  per  year  in  the  period  1976-78
(see  table  1).  A key question  here is why real  interest  rates  where so high
during  this  period?
On June  14,  1982,  with  Chile  in  the  middle  of a  major  crisis  resulting
from  a large  accumulated  decline  in competitiveness,  large  losses  in its  terms
of  trade,  and  significant  increases  in  international  and  domestic  interest  rates,
the  gove  nment  abandoned  the  fixed  exchange  rate  policy. There  ensued  a couple
of  years  of disorganized  macroeconomic  management,  after  which,  in 1984,  Chile
achieved  substantial  real  devaluation  and started  a sustained  recovery  at the3
time  when a "solution"  to a financial  crisis  was resulting  in  a large  increase
in central  bank liabilities. A key question  is how it achieved  that real
devaluation  without  an increase  in inflation.
The  rest  of the  paper  is  orgarized  as follows. Section  II  presents  an
overview  of  Chile's  macroeconomic  policies,  particularly  in  the  1970s  and  1980s.
The next section  analyzes  the policies  introduced  at the beginning  of the
military  government  to deal  with the  money  over-hang  and  accelerating  inflation
of September  1973. Section  IV examines  the  shock  treatment  of 1975. Section  V
looks  at  the  exchange  rate-based  stabilization  of  1978-82  --  and  at  their  impact
on  inflation.  Section  VI  examines  the  behavior  of  interest  rates  an.i  Section  VII
the post-1984 adjustment.  Finally  Section  VIII concludes  with an overall
evaluation  of the  post 1973  period  drawing  the  corresponding  lessons  from  that
stabilization  experience.
II.  CHILE'S  ECONOMIC  POLICIES:  AN OVERVIEW'
Beginning  in the 1930s and up to 1974, Chile pursued the classic
strategy  of  promoting  industrialization  through  import  substitution.  The  primary
emphasis  was on trade  and  exchange  rate  policies  --  quotas,  tariffs,  multiple
exchange  rates  and  on  average,  an  overvalued  currency  --  all  of  which
discriminated  against  mining  and  agriculture  and  against  exports  (Behrman,  1976;
Corbo and Meller, 1981).  A further  problem  was that the structure  of the
effective rates  of protection under  the  different trade regimes varied
Much has been written on the Chilean economic  experience.  See in
parti  ular Corbo (1985a),  Edwards  and Edwards (1987),  Ffrench-Davis  (1982),
Foxley  (1981),  Harberger  (1982),  Zahler  (1983),  Fontaine  (1989)  and Solimano
(1990).4
con.idecably  across  industries. 2 There  were no major restrictions  on  capital
:nflows  dur.  g  this  period,  although  outflows  were  quite  controlled.  By  the  end
of  the  1960s,  GDP  growth  had  slowed  to  only  2.1  percent  per  year,  while  inflation
was  running  around  301  and  unemployment  around  6Z. Chile's  performance  compa.ed
unfavorably  with that  of other  upper  middle-income  developing  countries  (Worl
Bank,  1983).
In  1970,  the  Allende  government  came  to  power. During  its  three  years
of rule,  from  November  1970  to September  1973,  it tried  to implement  a radical
transformation  towa:ds  a socialist  economy. The  macroeconomic  policy  entailed
large  increases  in  expenditures  that  were  not  matched  by increases  in  government
revenues,  a  large  public  sector  deficit  emerged  and  as  there  sas  not  a  market  for
government  debt,  mcnetary  expansion  and  a balance-of-payments  crisis  followed.
To suppress  the  growing  inflation  and  address  the severe  balance-of-payments
crisis,  the government  intensified  the  price controls  and trade restrictions
across the economy.  Control of foreign trade and credit, elong with cormodity
rationing, became important parts of the macroeconomic policy.  The g.svernment
also  nationalized the  major copper  mines (that  were owned  by foreign companies),
the  domestic  banking sector,  accelerated  the  land  reform  process initiated  at the
Frei  administration, a radicalization  that  at the end disrupted agriculture,  and
2  The composition of imports during the 1960s showed the effect of this
system  of protection:  only 15 percent of imports  were consumer goods, about 30
percent  were  investment  goods,  and  55  percent  were  intermediate  products.  As the
structure  of imports  moved  away from  consumption  goods  toward  raw  mate rials,
parts and equipment  essential  to the industrial  sector, and without close
domestic  substitutes,  the  Chilean  economy  became  more  vulnerable  to  fluctuations
in the world -onomy.  Furthermore,  the import-substituting  strategy,  by
protecting  capi il-intensive  activities,  gave  rise  to  only  a low  level  of labor
absorption  (see  Corbo  and  Meller  1981).5
either  took  over or allowed  workers  to take  over the  most important  firms  in
manufacturing.
By the end of 1973 the Chilean economy was  showing substantial
macroeconomic  imbalances. The public  sector  deficit  which increased  from  6.7
percent of GDP in 1970 to 30.5 percent  of GDP in 1973. caused  internal  and
external  imbalances  (Table  1).  The internal  imbalance  led to accelerating
inflation  even  with the  widespread  price  cont.ols  and  rationing. The  external
disequilibrium  was temporarily  contained  by  widespread  restrictions  on foreign
trade  --  differentiated  tariffs, multiple exchange rates, and  extensive
quantitative  restrictions  on imports  and exports. 3 With controlled  interest
rates  that  were highly  negative  in real  terms,  organized  capital  markets  were
almost  nonexistent.  When  the  price  controls  were lifted  in  late  1973,  the  rate
of inflation  was roughly  1,000  percent  a year.
The Aliende regime  also changed  exchange  rate policies  drastically,
shifting  ultimately  to multiple rates for commodity  trade.  Initially,  it
abandoned  the  successful  crawling  peg  policy  of the  second  half  of  the  1960s  in
favor  cf a fixed  nominal  exchange  rate. Given  the sta.  f the  economy,  this
policy  could  only  be sustained  first  through  an increasingly  restrictive  trade
regime  and  with  multiple  exchange  rate  regime,  and  then  through  a.  series  of  major
devaluations.  Toward  the  end  of  Allende's  administration,  the  ratio  between  the
highest  and  lowest  official  exchange  rates  was 52 to 1.
3  The  restrictions  on commodity  trade  were  varied  and  considerable  by the
end  of 1973  (Torres  1982). The  Ad  valorem  tariff  rates  ranged  from  0  percent  to
750 percent,  value of 105 percent,  a mode of 90 percent  and a median  of 80
percent. Among  4,952  tariff  positions,  187  contained  import  prohibitions.  For
2,872  tariff  positions,  a  )0-day  non-interest-bearing  deposit  equal  to 10,000
percent  of the  CIF  value  w s required,  and  for  2,278  tariff  positions  previous
approval  had to  be obtained  before  presenting  an import  request.-6-
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The  domestic  cormmodity  markets  were  also  highly  regulated  by  the  end  of
the  Allende  regime,  with the  governmert  setting  more than  3,000  prices  through
a regulatory  body,  the  Direcci6n  de Industria  y Comercio  (DIRINCO). The  labor
market  in  the  organized  sector  was  characterized  by  low  mobility,  the  result of
large  severance  payments. The  government  was,  directly  and  indirectly,  a  major
employer.
In  September  '973  a  military  coup  ousted  Allende. The  economic  team  of
the  new  military  government  spent  its  first  two  years,  1974  and  1975,  trying  to
stabilize  the  economy. In  1974  it  introduced  a  major  tax  reform  and  in  both  1974
and 1975  it lowered  government  expenditures  significantly  to reduce  the  major
source  of the public  sector  deficit.  It also sold government  assets.  Good
prices  for  copper  in 1974  and  a rollover  of 30 percent  of the  outstanding  debt
service  in  1973  and  1974,  in  addition  to  the  above  measures,  eased  the  adjustment
to the first  oil shock.
As to trade  policy,  the government  lowered  the  nominal  tariffs  to a
maxir'-m  rate  first  set  at  140  percent  and  then  at  120  percent. By  June  1975,  it
had lifted  all the commodity  price cuntrolR  and removed  the  rcIntraints  on
domestic  interest  rates  by June 1975.  Following  a large  devaluation  in late
1973,  the relative  incentives  for  the  production  of exportable  goods  imDroved
substantially,  while  those  for  home  good.  and  highly  protected  import-competing
good.s  fell.
By late 1974 and early  1975 the  external  environment  was souring  --
copper  prices  dropped,  oil  stayed  high.  Because  of severely  restricted  access
to external  financing,  the  government  had to implement  one  of the  most severe
adjustment  programs  in  Chile's  economic  history  The  macroeconomic  adjustment
program  of 1975  was followed  by a comprehensive  set  of  policy  reforms. On the8
trade side all rcanaining  quantitative  restrictions  on trade  were lifted  and
tariffs  were gradually  reduced  to a  uniform  10  percent  by July  1979.  In 1976,
when  substantial  real  depreciation  had  been  achieved,  the  multiple  exchange  race
system  gave  way  to  a  unified  exchange  rate  system  and  :i  crawling  peg  targeted  to
achieve  a fairly  stable  real  exchange  rate (with,  however,  two  revaluations  of
10 percent,  the first in early June 19'6, the second in March 1977) was
instituted.
Liberalization  was much slower  in two areas.  One was labor policy
though some qualifications  are  ir  rder here.  Suspension  of  collective
bargaining  and severe  restrictions  to labor  unions  activities  until  1979',  and
high  unemployment  in  most  of  the  period,  weakened  the  bargaining  power  of labor,
so in that  sense  it is  hard  to say  this  was Ai  very 'protected'  market  in  Chile
during  the  military  regime. Howeve:,  concerning  wage  policy  a serious  mistake
from  the  viewpoint  of  consistency  with  the  overall  macroeconomic  policy  was  done
in mid-1979,  at the time the Plan  Laboral  was launched,  when compulsory  100
percent  backward  wage indexation  (introduced  in October  1974 for the public
sector) was extended to those under collective  bargaining  in the private
sector. 5 This  undesirable  reform  resulted  in  an unsustainable  appreciation  of
the real  exchange  rate  and  a macro  crisis. The real  exchange  rate  would  have
appreciated,  albeit  to a lesser  extent,  even  without  backward  wage indexation
because  of the sluggish  adjustment  of the  prices  of nontraded  goods.
'  The  Plan Laboral of  1979 sanctioned in  a  new  labor code the
flexibilization  of labor  practices.
6  For  a review  of the  indexation,  see  A. Edwards  (1985).For  a review  of
wage and  labor  policies  in the  last  25 years  in  Chile  see  Solimano  (1988).9
Liberalization  of  capital  inflows  also  proceeded  slowlv  with important  reforms
introduced  only  in June  1979.5
With inflation  continuing,  in  early  1977,  a debate  developed  about  the
causes  of inflation  and  the  most  appropriate  way  to  deal  with them. That  debate
led  to two  10 percent  revaluations,  which  were expected  to lower  inflation  and
sterilize  part of the accumulation  of reserves. Toward  the end of 1977,  the
government  targeted  the  rate  of devaluation  to  exceed  the  rate  of inflation  to
compensate  the  import-competing  sector  for  the  announced  tariff  reductions.  In
February  1978,  it established  an active  crawling  peg system  with an explicit
stabilization  objective.  For  this  purpose,  the  rate  of  crawl  was  established  at
well belciv  the  difference  between  domestic  and foreign  inflation.
Then,  in  -June  1979,  with  the  monthly  rate  of inflation  about  2.5Z.  the
government  fixed  the  exchange  rate  at  39  pesos  per  dollar. Finally,  in  late  1979
it  introdaced  a  new  labor  code  that  re-established  collective  bargaining,  albeit
for  ju,st  a fraction  of the  labor  force,  and  mandated  a formula  for  a  wage floor
thit  went  well  beyond  the  indexation  instituted  in late  1974.
The policy reforms from 1979 to 1982 emphasized improving the
functioning  of  the  domestic  commcdity  markets  and  further  deregulation  of  capiLal
flows. However,  pressure  developed  for  compensatory  duties  to comnpensate  the
sectors  suffering  the  most from  the  effects  of the real  appreciation  that  was
developing. The government  modified  the tariff  policy  providing  compensatory
duties  to countervail  foreign  dumping.  By the end of 1986,  however,  only 16
products  received  compensatory  duties.
Beginning  in 1983,  the  government  made several  changes  in the  uniform
tariff  of  10Z arguing  that  were  needed  for  fiscal  reasons.  One  was  to -aise  the
5  See  Corbo (1985a)  Appendix.10
level to 20Z and then to 35Z.  However, as the anti-export bias of this policy
was becoming  clea , in February  1985  the  new  minister  of finance  reduced  the
level of the uniform tariff to 302 in March  1985, 202 in  June [  7  ] and 15Z
in January 1988.
On  the financial side, following the large devaluation cf 1982 and
sharp recession  in  that  year (GDP  dropped 14.11  in  1e2),  a substantial financial
crisis developed.  To avoic widespread bankruptcy by financial institutions  and
productive enterprises, the government established a comprehensive policy to
rescue financially distressed institutions  financed by a large expansion in the
quasi-fiscal deficit of the Central Bank. 7 /s a result, the overall public
sector deficit  (including an estimate of the quasi-fisca:  subsidies of the
Central Bank) increased from a surplus of 0.3% of GDP in 1981 to a deficit of
9.82 of GDP in 1985 (see  Table 1).  However by 1988 it had reduced to surplus of
3.02 of GDP.  The government financed the public sector deficit with domestic
borrowing and foreign borrowing by the Central Bank, thus avoiding --  in the
short run --  monetization and inflation.
After 1984,  the  government designed  a  comprehensive adjustment aimed  at
restoring  macro  balances  in  a  situation  of  restricted  access  to  foreign
borrowing.  Key polices were a combination of an aggressive  nominal devaluation
and supportive  fiscal and  monetary policies to achieve  a large real devaluation.
Given the improved efficiency of the tradable sector, the real devaluation  was
designed  to  achieve  a  large  expansion  in  import-competing  and  exportable
activities, and in this  way to start a sustained  recovery.  As mentioned before,
a  distinctive feature of the post-1984 adjustment process  is that no major
7  On the innovative plan to deal with the financial crisis, see Larrain
(1989).11
acceleration in inflation took place in spite of both a  major real depreciation
of the exchange rate --  around 45 percent between 1984-89 -and the solution of
a severe domestic financial crises.
III.  October 1973 : 'Corrective' Inflation and Money Overhang
This  section  examines the  policies introduced  in  September/October 1973
to deal  with the  money overhang and inflation.  In  particular,  we look  at  whether
the increases in prices and the monetary expansion of late 1973  were cco.istent
with the elimination of the money overhang.8
Some of the measures the new regime implemented in October 1973 with
respect to the price, exchange rate and  wage policies were (see  Gotuzo, 1973):
(i)  liberalization  of  most  controlled  prices,  maintaining  temporary
subsidies to basic foodstuff products.
(ii)  after a sharp  devaluation, establishment  of a  dual exchange  market with
a single exchange rate for exports and imports and a much higher rate
for tourism.
(iii)  granting of wage readjustments --  below inflation --  suor'emented by
bonuses and some  modest increases in non-wage payments.
The government supplemented these measures with an initial attempt to
improve the budgetary situation of the public sector through drastic ir.creases
8  As noted, the macroeconomic situation in September of 1973, the month
when  the  military coup occurred,  was one of repressed inflation  and generalized
excess demand  in different markets,  as reflected  in scarcities and queues.
Widespread black markets for  basic goods and foreign  exchange  were the result  of
the  system  of  fixed prices  set  at  artificially  low  levels  at  a  time  of
increasingly expansionary policies.12
in  the  prices  of  public  enterprises  to  reduce  their  losses.9  A  more
comprehensive  fiscal reform  was implemented in 1975.
Table 2  summarizes  the  behavior  of  prices,  money, the exchange rate  and
wages  following  the price  deregulation of October  1973.  When  prices were
deregulated in October 1973, they jumped significantly --  46Z that month.  In
turn,  the  devaluation of  the  exchange rate  for  trade transactions  was 229  percent
(the  devaluation for the exchange rate for tourism  was around 1,000 percent).
It is important to look at the causes behind this large jump in the
price level in order to learn  more about  how to  deregulate prices after a period
of control. 10
Our basic contention is that the sudden jump in prices was closely
linked  to a  money overhang that  had  been accumulating since  1971  as a  consequence
of the  overly expansionary  monetary policies in the context  of controlled  prices
and  a falling demand  for  money, the result  of  the accelerat  ion in  inflation since
1972.  To assess the importance of the money overhang in Chile in that period,
we  estimate  a  semi-logarithmic  demand  for  money  equation  with  a  partial
adjustment mechanism  for the  period 1960:2  to  1970:4.11  We  then use  that
estimate to  measure the excess supply  in  the  money  market --  the  money overhang -
- for  the period  1970-73.
9  A measure in that direction  was the establishment of a uniform wage and
compensation system for the public sector (escala  unica).
1o Although the  misalignments of relative  prices associated  with the system
of controls in Chile in  1973  was quite extreme, its experience  does prove useful
lessons for countries  using price controls  as  part of a disinflationary  package.
Chile apparently never considered the alternative of a monetary reform of the
type pursued in  Germany immediately after  World War II,  with a  capital levy (or
semi-confiscation) of the holding of money (Wallich 1955).
11  On the specification and estimation of demand for  money for Chile, see
Corbo (1982) and Matte and Rojas (1988).13
Table  2:  PRICES,  MONEY,  THE EXCHANGE  RATE  AND  WAGES  IN  CHILE.
(rate  of  change,  %)
Inflotion  Vono  Official  Nominal  Avoraoe  Nominal
Vate-M)  Su  Ml)  Exchange  rato  wag
1973
August  17.06  10.0  13.8
Sept.mb.r  16.88  9.0  14.86
October  o/  46.20  8.0  229.0  22.2  b/
November  5.69  20.0  3.6
December  4.74  30.0  18.2
1974
January  14.49  11.0  8.1  32.08  c/
February  22.87  14.0  12.1
Sourco:  YoNez  (1979)  for  tho  estimate  of  inflation  and  Banco  Central  de  Chile
(1986)  for the  other  series.
a/ Wonth of  price  dorogulation
b/ Variation  with  rospect  to  July.
c/ Variation  with  respect  to  October.
The estimated  money  demand  equation  is  (the  t-statiatics  in  parentheses):
ln(M/P)  =  -1.732  - 0.0064  ir +  0.382  lnY +  0.826  ln(M/P):
(-3.38) (-3.41)  (3.48)  (14.44)
R 2 = 0.978  F-stat =  602.57
D.W  =  1.75  N =  43
log. likelihood =  79.12
where
ln(M/P)  natural log of real  money balances, real Ml.
expected rate  of inflation.  It is taken as  the rate  of
change in (this period) CPI.  For the CPI we use an
estimate prepared by Yafiez  (1979)  which corrects for
repressed inflation.
lnY  =  natural log of GDP.14
According to Table 3 and Figure 1,  there  was considerable  excess supply
in the  money market between 1971  and 1973. Moreover, it grew considerably after
the last quarter of 1972, reaching  a quarterly average of 37.8Z of the stock of
real balances demanded in the economy between 1972:4 and 1973:3.  It is also
interesting to  note that the  excess supply  of  money did  not disappear in the  last
quarter of 1973 in spite of the sharp price increase of October 1973.
In  part the reason is that  monetary policy in the last quarter of 1973 was quite
accommodating as can be seen in Table 2.  In fact,  between November and  December
of that year Ml grew 501 while the cumulative price increase from October until
December was 56Z.  Interestingly, the reduction in the  excess supply  of money in
the last quarter of 1973 was around  6Z (Table 3).  It is clear that a large
excess  supply  of money  --  or money  overhang  --  remained  to be  eliminated  even
after the price adjustment of  the last quarter of 1973.12
Table  3:  MONEY  OVERHANG  IN  CHILE 1971-73
(money  supply  minus  money  demend as  share













12  Ramos  (1980) advances the hypothesis that the price level increase of
october 1973 amounted to an overshooting  of around 50 percent using the criteria
of the official price level increase required to restore the level of real
balances of 1970. In addition Ramos argues that the overshooting in the price
level cut aggregate demand giving rise to a slump in economic activity on the
demand  side.FI1? re  I
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This important  finding  may help  explain  why inflation  did  not recede
after  the  burst  of "corrective  inflation"  in the  fourth  quarter  of 1973.
IV.  The Honetary  Shock  of 1975  and  the Dynamics  of Disinflation
a.  Monetary  Policy  Revisited
The  actual  stance  of  monetary  policy  in  the 'shock  treatment"  of 1975
which entailed  a drastic  drop in the rate of growth  of money,  has been the
subject  of  controversy.  The  severe  fiscal  adjustment  lead  to  a further  reduction
of  3.4  percentage  points  of GDP  in  the  consolidated  non-financial  public  sector
deficit  in  1975,  in  spite  of a drastic  recession  that  year (GDP  dropp3d  12.92).
However,  it is not  clear  if  monetary  policy  was indeed  tight.  Some  have even
argued  that  there  was  no  monetary  shock  in  Chile  in  1975  (e.g.,  Harberger  [1982]
notes the high rates of money growth in that year).
Here  we define  the  stance  of  monetary  policy  not  just in terms  of  the
supply side of the  money market, but also by comparing the supply of  money with
the demand for  money.  As is  well-known, it is  expected that  a stabilization plan
will produce a fall in the velocity of money --  an increase in the demand for
money --  if it is credible.  To determine the degree of excess demand or supply
in  the  money  market,  we  estimate  a  demand  for  money  equation  using  quarterly  data
for  the  period  1976:1  to 1989:1.13
Using  a similar  specification  (and  definition  of variables)  as before
for  the  demand  for  money,  (but  note  that  as  interest  rates  were  deregulated  after
13 In  est  mating  the  quantity  of  money  demanded  in  1975:1-1976:2  we control
for  the  drcp  a,L  GDP  of 12.9Z  that  year. We do  so  by  using  the  level  of  GDP  that
would  have  been  observed  if  the  growth  target  of  6  percent  set  by  economic  policy
for 1975 had been achieved (Cauas  1975).17
May 1975,  the expected  cost of holding  money is represented  by the nominal
interest  rate,  i,  paid  on 30-89  day  financial  instruments),  we get
ln(M/P) - -1.45  - 0.005 i +  0.326 ln Y +  0.645 ln(M/P)-,
(-1.92)  (-1.85)  (2.06)  (  7.69)
R2  _  0.88  F-stat  - 121.68
D.W. =  1.91  N - 53
Log likelihood  - 57.19.
As Figure  2 and  Table  4 show,  there  was an excess  demand  for  money  in
the money market in 1975 and the first two quarters  of 1976."  That is,
monetary  policy,  as  measured  by the  degree  of  excess  demand  in  the  money  market,
was particularly  tight in the second  quarter  of 1975, coincident  with the
launching  of the "Cauas  Plan"  in  April  of that  year.'5  It is also interestinig
to  note that  monetary  policy  was  tightened  in  the  second  quarter  ot 1976  as the
rate  of inflation  regained  the  pace  of early  1976.
Having  established  that monetary  policy  was indeed  tight under the
orthodox  stabilization  plan  of 1975 (fiscal  policy  was undoubtedly  restrictive
as  well, since  the fiscal  deficit  dropped  from  10.5Z  of GDP in  1974  to 2.62  in
14  Sjaastad  and  Cortes  (1978)  and  Lagos  and  Galetovic  (1989)  arrived  at a
similar  conclusion  for  1975.
Is  The  decision  to reduce  inflation  through  tight  fiscal  policies  seemed
to  have  been  very firm,  as this  quotation  from  Cauas (1975,  p. 155)  indicates:
"The  budgets  and  programs  in force  for  the  purchase  of goods  and services  in
public  institutions  and state  enterprises  will be reduced  between  15 and 25
percent.  These reductions  will be implemented  at any cost, including  the
dismissal  of any functionaries  who are  unable  to understand  that  the  reduction
of inflation  receives  tcr  priority  in the  economic  policy.,.  their  particular
interests  as  institution  or  individuals,  although  very  respectable,  are  totally
without importance  in comparison  with  the principal  preoccupation  of all
Chileans,  namely  inflation.'18
1975),  it  remains  an open  question  why it  took  so  long  for  the  rate  of  inflation
to fall at least  below  the three-digits  level,  a drop  that  only took  place  in
1977.
Table  4:  EXCESS  SUPPLY  FOR  UONEY  IN  1976  AND  EARLY  1976
(money  supply  minus  monoy  doemnd  as




1976.4  - 1.8
1976.1  -1.X
1976.2  -11.3
B.  Wny Inflation  Took  So Long  To Come  Down
To address  that  question  we examine  the role  of two  factors  that  may
have  contributed  tc the  slowness  of the  deceleration  of inflation:
(i)  the  inflationary  effect  of the  exchange  rate  policy  (complemented  with
fiscal restraint),  which was oriented  to achieving  a further  real
depreciation  of the  peso in  1975.  That  real  depreciation  was in  turn
a  response  to the  large  drop  of  452  in he real  price  of copper  between
1974 and  1975 and  the planned reductions in tariffs.  A  real
depreciation  was  accomplished  by following  a  very  aggressive  policy  of
nominal  devaluations.
(ii)  the  persistency  effect  that  resulted  from  the  wage indexation  rule  for
the  public  sector  wages  that  geared  them  the  previous  periods  rate  of
inflation.19
We also  will examine  the  speed  of  disinflation  and the  output  cost  of
a counterfactual  path for  money  growth  during  the  stahilization  shock  of 1975.
A simple  model  of inflation  determination,  along  the  lines  of  Bruno  and
Fischer  (1986)  and  Fischer  (1988),  is  set  up to deal  empirically  with  the  issue
of  velocity  and  the  cost  of  the  disinflation  needed  to  explain  the  difficulty  in
lowering  inflation  in  Chile  after  1975.
This  aggregative  open  economy  model  is comprised  of aggregate  demand,
aggregate  supply  and  wage  equations.  Aggregate  demand  in  the  goods  market,  Y4,
is made a function  of the stock  of real balances,  M/P; a vector  of fiscal
variables,  Z, including  real spending  and taxes;  and the real exchange  rate,
EP/P.  A shift  factor,  q,  is introduced  to  reflect  demand  shocks. The  equation
is
. f(  M/P, Z,  EP/P, q)  (1)
Aggregate  pply,  Y  ,  is  made an inverse  function  of: the  real  wage,
W/P;  the  real  price  oi  imported  inputs,  which  is  made  equal  to  the  real  exchange
rate for the sake of simplicity,  EP'/P;  and a factor,  u, that reflects  the
effects  of supply  shocks:
Y'  - h( W/P, EP'/P ,  u)  (2)
If we  let the price level,  P, equilibrate  aggregate  demand  with
aggregate  supply,  we get:
P =  P (M,  EP',  W, Z, q, u)  (3)20
Expressing  equation  (3)  in terms  of rates  of change,  where g,  is the
rate  of  change  in  the  variable  x,  g,  - Ox/x,  and  denoting  the  rate  of inflation
by  X, we have:
ir  = ir(  g.,  g.,  g., ,  )(4)
where  g.  is the  rate  of growth  of the  money  supply,  g.  is  the  rate -f  growth  of
nominal  wages,  g.  is  the rate  of devaluation,  ', is the  rate  of foreign
inflation,  and C represents  changes  in aggregate  supply  and aggregate  demand.
Solving  for  the  rate  of growth  of demand,  we have
gy  =  f( gm/p,  gp./p,  k)  (5)
where  gp  is the  rate  of growth  of real  balances,  g.*,*,  is  the  rate  of change  in
the real exchange  rate,  and  k is a vector  representitng  changes  in the fiscal
parameters  and  terms  of trade.
The  rate  of growth  of  nominal  wages  in  the  model,  g.,  is  made  a function
of the rate of expected  inflation,  r,  the deviation  of current  output from
potential  output,  Y/Y, and  the  rate  of  growth  of  labor  productivity,  g,,.  Given
that  wages are  indexed  to  past inflation,  we use the  last  periods  inflation  in
the wage equation. instead of expected inflation (although  the degree of
indexation  has  changed  during  the  period). 16
16  See  Cortszar  (1983),  Corbo  (1985b),  and  Solimano  (1988)  for  an  analysis
of wage  policy  in  Chile.21
g, - s(g 1*,  Y/  Y,  g, 1).  (6)
The econometric  estimation  of the inflation,  GDP growth and Wage
equations  are carried  out,  equation  by equation,  by two  stages  least  squares,
2SLS,  in order  get  consistent  estimates  of the  parameters. The  equations  are
estimated  using quarterly  data for the period 1974.1  to 1989:1.  The 2SLS
estimate of  the  inflation equatioa yields  (the t-statistics  are  in  the
parentheses):"7
r  =  - 0.0045 +  0.358 g,  +  0.197 (g.  +  r*)  +  0.210 (g*(_,)  +  W*(-l))
(-0.62)  (3.68)  (2.19)  (6.96)
+  0.155  gM,(- 3 )  +  0.029  DUMP
(3.95)  (1.19)
R 2 =  0.94  F-stat  =  197.79
D.W =  2.11  N  =  61
Log likelihood =  116.71
where  w'  is  measured  as the  implicit  rate  of foreign  inflation  in  the  imported
component  of the  wholesale  price  index,  gM,  is  the  rate  of  change  in  Ml and  the
variable  DUMP is  a dummy  taking  the  average  value  of 1 in  1979:2,  1982:2-3  and
1984:3,  at  the  time  that  discrete  devaluations  took  place.  An interesting  result
of the  estimation  is  the  time  lag  that  takes  the  rate  of  money  growth  to affect
the rate of inflation significantly  is three quarters (the value of the
coefficient  is  rather  low). That  result  is  evidence  of  a lack  of  sensitivity  of
inflation  to  decelerations  in  the  rate  of  growth  of  nominal  spending  in  the  short
17  The instruments  used in the  estimation  of the inflation  equation  are:
the  constant,  g..)  ,  g(,l),  r(-1).  g.( 2),  1r(-1),  g  Ir, 3 - ,  ),  DUMP.22
run, a well-recognized  feature of inflationary  processes  with an inertial
component.
The  2SLS  estimation  of the  GDP  equation  in  rate  of  growth  form  for  the
same sample  period  isle:
gY - 0.023  +  0.211  (g,,(,)  - r(-1))  - 0.051  (g*(-2)  +  f*(-2)  - W(-2))
(4.28)  (4.85)  (-1.60)
- 0.517  gY()  - 0.071  DUMMY
(-4.36)  (-5.06)
R2= 0.49  F-stat - 13.57
D.W. =  2.57  N - 60
log  likelihood =  116.44
Concerning  this  estimation,  it  appears  that  the  rate  of  growth  of real
money  is  significant  with  a  one  period  lag. A real  depreciation  affects  the  rate
of change  in  GDP  with two lags,  as  was expected  (following  the  dynamics  of the
export  response  to  changes  in  the  real  exchange  rate). In  turn,  the  sign  of the
coefficients  suggests  the possibility  of a contractionary  devaluation  in the
short run in Chile,  a feature  that confirms  the finding  of other empirical
studies  of  devaluation  for  Chile  and  other  developing  countries."9  Finally,  the
dummy  variable,  DUMMY,  takes  the  value  of 1  in  1975:1-4  and  1981:4  until  1983:1,
corresponding  to  the  two  large  recessions  that  took  place  during  the  sample
period.
*  The instruments  used in the  estimation  were: the  constant  term,
- r(-l),  8.((S)  +  Tr(-3)  - r(-3),  DUMMY, g,(_I)  ,  and  the  rate  of  change  of
GDP in  mining.
19  See Solimano  (.,986  and 1989)  for  effect  of  a devaluation  on output
employment  and  the  trade  balance  in the  case  of Chile  and  Edwards  (1986)  for  a
sample  of developing  countries.23
Finally, the 2SLS estimation of the  wage equation for the same sample
period yields:O
g. = 0.011  +  0.912  r(-l)  +  0.636  (y(-l)  - g,(-l))
(1.044)  (14.76)  (1.11)
R2 = 0.86  F-stat =  184.59
D.W.  =  2.22  N = 60
log.likelihood =  85.97
The  coefficients  of  the  contemporaneous  rate  of  inflation  and the  output
gap in the current period were excluded from the regression because they were
found to be statistically non-significant. As  was  expected,  the  rate  of inflation
in the last period turned out to be highly significant, with a value close to
unity, a reflection of the lagged  wage indexation followed in Chile during  most
of the sample  period.  Moreover, the  coefficient for the rate of change in labor
productivity with one period lag, gy(,,)  - g,(-, is 0.636.
Figures 3, 4  and 5  show how the model  tracks, done by comparing a
(dyna.mic)  base simulation using the observed values of the exogenous variabies
with the actual values of inflation, GDP growth and rate of change in nominal
wages.
Using  the  estimates  of  the model  reported  above we  perform  some
counterfactual simulations to shed light  on the factors  underlying the slow  pace
of disinflation observed after the orthodox shock treatment was implemented in
Chile in  1975.  The  counterfactual simulations  involve: (i)  an exchange  rate rule
whereby PPP is  maintained by devaluing the  nominal exchange rate  at a rate  equal
to the difference between domestic and foreign inflation in 1975 (As  mentioned,
2Z  The instruments used in the estimation  were the constant term, r(-l),
gy  (-2'  - g  ;-2,  *  "  (  - i  j  .24
the actval rule in that year  was to  devalue at a rate  higher than the difference
between the rates of domestic and foreign inflation); (ii)  a change in the  wage
rule  from  lagged wage  indexation  to  indexation  based  on  contem,;:cranecus
inflatior.;71  and (iii) a combination of  (i) and (ii).  For each sirm.u'atia  we
examine  the  associated  path  of  inflation,  output  and  nominal  wages,  we.  we
co,..,-are  to the simulated  values (see  tables 5-8).  We are not advocati.-.  cha
PFP rule  should,  have been  followed for  the  exchange rate  as the fundamen.  -:.s.
were changing during this period.  Rather we use this alternative rul  e  st
the pirpose of designing a counterfactual.
The counterfactual simulations show tha  to som.e  extent the  -x.ha:.
rate and the wage  rules  2ollowed during the disinflation of  1975 ten,ded  to
postpone the reduction  of inflation  in  Chile.  Table 5 shows  that  the size  of the
anti-inflationary gains from the slower pace of de'raluation  are greater i^.
short  run,  as  colum,n  1  indicates.  However,  the  implicit  acceleratio..:^.
infla:in--associated  with the  exchange  rate  rule  actually followed  in  975 f:niV_
i  * e a r  - rJ d  5  7
Sn the -ther  hanrd,  he  altern-ative  wage  rule  --  that  geare_  ,  -
rat.et phar.  lagged  wage  i'doxat  icn  --  has  a  more  a:+  ing disiil..tio...  e+
over  t  ^e,  as  o'I-,  2  shows.  FurtherTmocsre,  the  counterfactual  sicoclat  ion
c-.'ini:.g  bcth.  a  chan.ge  .r.  the  ex;hange  rate  anrd  the  wage  rule  3sirrula  ion.
shows  th'.at  the  m.netude  of  tlht  isinflation  under  those  two  counterfa.t'_a
po~:iy  r_les are  non-n--:eolicible.  . Ivten  p erspective,  the  occurrence  of  :uverse
;  : era t i,-.a.'  this  ru  e  re.,ires  a  wage  ircrease  based con  an.  esironte.'
if  -a ton.  . a^.  a_ustnent  at  the  end  of  the  period  to  correct  for  the
.. ''ff  ~~w,  f.t  ''  e, '''t.nS'.-  -. a+a  -fai>CHILE
INFLATION, GDP GROWTH AND WAGE GROWTH
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Table  5:. RATE  OF  INFLATION  --  COUNTERFACTUAL  SIMULATIONS
(difference  between  the  counterfactual  simulations
and  the  base  simulation,  percentages)
(1)  (2)  (3)
Exchange  Rate  Policy  Change  in  the  Wage  Rule  Simulation  3
of  Maintaining  PPP  to  Conteinporaneous  !ndexation  (Sim.1&2)
in  1976  (simulation  1)  (simulation  2)
1976:1  -6.62  2.78  - 5.96
1975:2  - 11.62  1.11  - 16.39
1976:3  - 6.30  - 4.38  - 8.85
1975:4  - 4.18  - 0.92  - 6.32
1976:1  - 8.76  1.84  - 11.69
1978:2  - 2.77  - 1.13  - 1.32
1976:3  4.93  - 4.06  6.13
1976:4  3.39  - 1.17  0.68
1977:1  - 4.80  3.01  - 9.12
1977:2  - 4A37  - 0.17  - 6.81
1977:3  2.69  - 2.19  4.37
1977:4  6.06  - 2.10  4.74
external shocks --  such as the drop in real copper prices --  is likely to have
retarded disinflation in 1975.  On the other hand, the practice of lagged  wage
indexation and  aggressive devaluation  also  contributed to  the inertia inflation,
making the restrictive fiscal and monetary policies less effective in reducing
inflation.
The  Chilean experience  of  1975 illustrates  the  trade-off,  often  present
in the practice of stabilization, betweern  mtore  rapid disinflation and the need
to adjust  the  real exchange  rate  (a move  that  often  result  in a  temporal
acceleration of inflation) to restore  external balance in the wake of adverse
external shocks.
The slow  pace  of disinflation  in  Chile in  spite  of the fiscal  adjustment
and the tight  monetary policy put in place in 1975 suggests two different views27
of the dynamics of disinflation and the appropriate policies for attacking it.
One view would question to what degree it was efficient to rely just on tight
money and fiscal policies to reduce inflation in 1975 in a country like Chile,
with its history of four decades of inflation and given that the indexation
mechanisms and record  of failed stabilization  would likely  make people skeptical
of the  possibility of quick disinflationary results.  In fact, recent  experience
with  restrictive  fiscal  policy  --  cum  --  income  policies  in chronic  inflation
countries shows that the speed with which inflation is lowered and the output
cost of disinflation can be reduced with respect to what  is possible under a
purely orthodox package (e.g.,  Israel and Mexico).22
The other view would argue that disinflation  was slow  because monetary
policy  was  too  accommodating,  a  situation  that  validated  inflationary
expectations in spite of the sharp fiscal adjustment.
The following counterfactual  simulation  examines the anti-inflationarv
gains and the cost of disinflation on output growth  that  might have resulted  had
a tighter monetary policy been fLollowed.  In  this simulation,  we cut  ir.  half  the
rate of  growth of Ml of the previous years starting in  1975.23
The  exercise shows (Table  6  and  Figure 9)  that  a tighter  monetary policy
would have produced little  extra anti-inflationary  gain in  the short run  --  say,
in the first year  --  when compared to the  actual monetary policy.  Instead, the
larger  anti-inflationary  gains  would have resulted  in  the second  and third  years.
22  For reviews of different stabilization experiences, see Bruno et al.
(1988),  as well as Kiguel and Liviatan (1988)  and Solimano (1989).
23  The counterfactual quarterly rates of money growth under this tighter
Dney alternative are: 202 per quarter for 1975, 102  per quarter for 1976 and 5%
?r quarter for 1977.  The actual average quarterly rates of growth of Ml were
37.62 in 1975, 30.6% in 1976 and 20.32 in 1977.  The average rate of growth of
Ml in 1974 was 37.92.28
On  the real  side,  the  tightr  mono  to:v  pa,kae.& carries  with  it an extra  cost  to
the stabilization packagt, as it wae acccmipa,,aied  by additional deceleration in
the growth of CP,  rmainly,  )it  not o:.ly  in the short run.  That is, the cost of
qcuicker  disinflation  is slower  growth  in the  short run.  This  result  is basically
a consecquence  of:  (i) the stickiness of  inflation to decelerations in money
growth (a  goods  market phenomenon);  and (ii)  the  fact  that lagged  wage in'exaticn
de facto acts like a static  expectations mechanism that slows the adjustment of
wages and prices over time.
Table  8:  COUNTERFACTUAL  SIMULATION:  TIGHTER  MONETARY  POLICY  1976-77
(difference  with  control  simulation,pOrcentages)
(simulation  4)
Rate  of inflation  Rate  of GDP growth
1976:1  0.00  0.00
1976:2  0.00  - 1.97
197E:3  - 0.45  - 1.85
1976:4  - 0.67  - 2.82
1978:1  - 0.83  - 4.82
1978:2  - 1.33  - 0.18
1978:3  - 0.47  - 2.83
1978:4  - 0.80  - 1.60
1977:1  - 0.e0  -7.85
1977:2  - 1.94  - 0.20
1977:3  - o.el  - 1.B8
1977:4  - 0.8.  - 0.24
V.  Exchange  Rate Based Stabilization: 1978-82
An im.corrant  shift in  the approach to stabilizaLion  took  place in 1978.
Closed economy monetarism gave  way to strong  emphasis on  using the  exchange rate
as the chlif tool  for disinflation.  That change in approach was the result of
the  zoaolar  ticn in the so_-hern ccne countries, at that time of the  monetary29
approach to the balance of payments and also to the fact that as the trade
liberalization initiated in 1974 was approaching a uniform, across-the-board
tariff of 102 (except for small cars) in 1978, international  prices in domestic
currency started to play a major role in domestic price formation.2'  In that
context,  the nominal  exchange rate was  thought to be  a key  determinant  Oc
domestic inflatI  at.  Thus, in  February 1978 the  government instituted the syste:-.
of preannounced rates of devaluation, culminating in a rate of 39 pesos per
dollar, a level that was maintained until June 1982.
The result of the new stabilization plan was disinflation at a lower
pace  than  expected and  a  lack of  convergence between domestic  and  foreigr.
inflationi  within a reas  ,.able  period.  In turn, the effects of that situation
were  overvaluation of  the currency,  an unsustainable expansio.i  in domestic
expenditures, and of unsustainable  high current account  deficits --  close to 14'
of GDP in 1;61.  In addition, unfavorable external conditions in 1982 (the drop
in terms of trade and the increase in international interest rates) resulted in
high  real do:z;est.ic  interest rates anr a cut  in expenditures.  With  a f'xec
nominal exchanre rate  anid  inflexible  prices for  non-tradables, a  major recession
developed.  'rn  the context of a sharp in,crease  in  unemployment and the emergirng
recession in June 1982 the government abandoned the fixed exchange rate.
Then, ;ust  as  Chile  was initiating  the adjustment,  it  was hit by anc  ther
external  sho.k --  the sharp reduction in capital inflows that  followed the
diff.iculties  Mexico had in serving its aebt.  On top of the sharp recession, a
financial crisis was emerging.
24  There  is  a vast  literature on that period, e.g., Corbo  (1985a and
1985b), Edwards and  Ec ards (19587),  and Ffrench-Davis (1983). Corbo and  McNelis
(1989) used time-var: nt parameter estimation technique to detect structurai
changes in tihe  rules of price formation in manufacturing during the period of
trade liberal zationz  irn  the seventies 'n  Chile.30
One popular explanation for the appreciation of the peso was that a
system of full indexation of wages to the rate of increase in the CPI in the
previous  period  --  the  system  instituted  by  law  --  was,  in  the  cor.text of
declining  inflation,  bound  to  result  in  substantial  inertia  inflation  a.._
appreciation,  Furthermore, the large and unsustainable capital inflows of the
late 1970s and early 1980s provided temporary support for the much appreciated
real  exchange  rate  and  permitted  an  unsustainable level  of  domestic  expen-d.turas.
At the same time, real  wages rose at the rate of the reduction
in inflation, with  real wages  in dollars rising ever more because the fixed
nominal exchange rate led to increasing overvaluation.25
To  explore  quantitatively  the  role of  alternative wages  rules  in-
disinflation under an exchange rate-based stabilization effort such as the one
tried  in  Chile  between  1978  and  mid-1982,  we  perform  two  counterfac;'al
simulations: (i)  a  change in  the  wage irdexation  rule from  full  lagged indexation
(the  rule followed  after June 1979) to full  contemporaneous indexation; and (ii'
the indexation of rominal wages to the exchange rate.
Tab'e 7  and  Figures 1C, 11  and 12  show that  the indexing  of  wages to the
exchan-e rate prc_dces larger and q,uicker  disinflation.  In turn, the ru:e of
contenmoraneous wage indexation tends to dominate the rule of lagged indexation
in te  s of disinflation  ary gain,s.
We now examine the associated path of GDP growth and the behavior of
real  wages and the real exchange rate under these two alternatives wage r_'es.
As Table 8 reveals, rep'acing lagged for  current inflation or the  exchange rate
There  was do:..estic  defl! ion in.  Chile ir,  February 1982.  However, what
was needed to  correct the  cuc-..lat  e overvaluation  and  maintain the fixed  nominal
parity  with the dollar  was a  protracted period of  domestic deflation. Obviously,
the  real  cost of such  a  path  of defaticrn-induced  real  depreciation  was enor.ous.31
Table  7:  EFFECTS  ON INFLATION  OF  ALTERNATIVE  WAGE  RULES
IN  1978-82  --  COUNTERFACTUAL  SIMULATIONS
(difference  with  bass  simulation,  percentages)
Full  Contamporanoous  Wo  Idxotion  to
Wan9 Indexation  tho  ExcINNngo  Rate
(simulation 6  (simul tion 5)
1978:1  - 4.28  - 6.18
1978:2  - 2.29  - 6.37
1978:3  0.17  - 6.62
1978:4  - 2.14  - 6.12
1979:1  - 4.81  - 4.38
1979:2  9.62  1.87
1979:3  6.68  -12.24
1979:4  - 5.41  -16.40
1980:1  - 9.13  -12.33
1980:2  - a.86  - 7.49
1980:3  2.96  - 6 76
1980:4  - 8.86  - 8.17
1981:1  - 6.20  - 6.30
1981:2  - 1.62  - 3.48
1981:3  - 0.87  - 2.96
1981:4  - 2.72  - 3.82
1982:1  - 9.02  - 3.09
1982:2  7.88  21.68
1982:8  13.23  40.29
Table  8:  REAL  WAGES  AND  THE REAL EXCHANGE  RATE
UNDER  ALTERNATIVE  NOMINAL  WAGES  RULES
(Differencos  in rates  of growth  with  rospect
to  tho  base simulation,  percentagso)
Real  Wages  Real  Exchange  Rate
Contemporanoous  Indexation  to  tho  Conte-poraneous  Indexation  to the
Indexation  Rule  Exchange  Rate  Indexation  Exchange  Rate
(Simulation  6)  (Simulation  6)  (Simulation  6)  (Simulation  6)
1978.1  - 2.74  -3.97  1.63  2.22
1978.2  - 1.47  - 3.44  0.82  1.92
1978.3  0.11  - 4.18  - 0.08  2.34
1978.4  - 1.37  - 3.93  0.77  2.20
1979.1  - 3.09  - 2.81  1.73  1.67
1979.2  6.17  1.20  - 3.46  - 0.87
1979.3  4.22  - 7.86  - 2.36  4.39
1979.4  - 3.47  -10.62  1.94  6.86
1980.1  - 6.86  - 7.91  3.27  4.42
1980.2  - 2.47  - 4.80  1.38  2.69
1980.3  1.89  - 3.69  - 1.06  2.0e
1980.4  - 2.47  - 6.24  1.38  2.93
1981.1  - 3.98  - 4.04  2.22  2.26
1981.2  - 1.04  - 2.23  0  68  1.26
1981.3  - 0.43  - 1.89  0.24  1.06
1981.4  - 1.74  - 2.46  0.97  1.37
1982.1  - 6.78  - 1.98  .23  1.11
1982.2  6.04  13.90  - .82  - 7.78
1982.3  8.49  26.84  - 4.74  -14.4632
as  the  indexer  of  wages  to  speed  up disinflation  produces  slower  growth  in  real
wages. In  fact,  the  rate  of  growth  of  real  wages  under  both  the  contemporaneous
inflation  indexation  rule  and  the  exchange  rate-linked  rule is lower  than
in the  base simulation  (where  wage indexation  rule  adjusts  nominal  wages  based
in  lagged  inflation).  Furthermore,  indexation  to  the  exchange  rate  reduces  the
rate of growth of real wages more than does indexation  to contemporaneous
inflation.  The reason  is the deceleration  in the rate of devaluation  after
February  1978 (the  rate  was fixed  in June  1979). This result  would  have  been
reversed  had the  exchange  rate  policy  accelerated  devaluation.
With respect  to the  real  exchange  rate,  the  counterfactual  simulation
indicates  that it depreciates  at a higher  pace  under  the exchange  rate-linked
indexation  rule  for  nominal  wages  than  it does  under  the  rule  of indexation  to
current  inflation.  This  result  mirrors  the  slower  pace  of growth  of real  wages
under  this rule.  Nominal  wages  grow less  than  do prices  because  the  exchange
rate  is devalued  at a lower  rate  in  order  to speed  the  reduction  in inflation.
VI.  Financial  Openness  and Interest  Rates: Why Real Interest  Rates
Were  So High?
In  an  economy  where  controls  on  the  movement  of  private  capital  are  not
completely  effective,  the  observed  domestic  interest  rate (i)  can  be expressed
as  a weighted  average  of  the  uncovered  interest  parity  interest  rate  (i@)  and  the
domestic  interest  rate  that  would  be  observed  if  the  private  capital  account  were
completely  closed  (i').  [  see  Edwards  and  Khan (1985),  and  Haque  and  Montiel
(1989)].  That  is,
i - t i  +  (1-*)i';  0 <  <  1  (7)33
where  9  measures  the  degree  of  capital  mobility. If  t-1,  capital  mobility  would
be perfect and the observed  domestic  interest  rate would be equal to the
uncovered interest  parity interest  rate (the  world interest  rate plus the
expected  rate  of  depreciation).  If,  on  the  other  hand,  9-0,  the  capital  account
would be closed and the observed  domestic  interest  rate would be equal to
hypothetical closed economy interest rate.  As  the  capital account is
liberalized,  i should  increase.
Starting  with the  demand  for  money
ln(M"/P)  =  ao  +  ali  +  a 21n(y)  +  a3ln(M/P)-,;  a,<0;  a2,4 3>o,  (8)
where  y is real  output,  P is the  domestic  price  level  and  H0 is the  demand  for
money.  Assuming  equilibrium  in the  money  market  ln(H 0/P) =  ln(Ms/P)  =  ln(M/P)
an expression  for  the  observed  domestic  interest  rate  can  be derived:
i  =  -(adal)  - (a 2/a 1)ln(y)  - (a 31aj)ln(MIP).,  +  (l/al)ln(M/P).  (9)
If  the  private  capital  account  is  closed,  this  expression  can  be used  to  derive
the  hypoti.etical  closed  economy  interest  rate
1  =  -(aCa)  - (a2/I,)ln(y)  - (a3/a 1)ln(M/P)- 1 +  (l/ 1 a,)ln(M'/P)  (10)
where  M' is the  money  supply  given  a  closed  private  capital  account
(M'  M - Private Capital Account).34
Replacing  this  hypothetical  closed  economy  interest  rate  in  equation  (7)
we obtain
That  is,  the  deviation  of  the  observed  interest  rate  from  the  hypothetical  closed
economy  interest  rate  is  proportional  to  the  divergence  of  the  uncovered  interest
parity  interest  rate  from  the  closed  economy  interest  rate.
Edwards  And  Khan  use  a  similar  equation  to  derive  fixed  estimates  of  the
degree of capital mobility. 26 A major problem with the Edwards and Khar
approach,  however,  is that  *  is  not  constant  fo.  countries  where  tne  degree  of
capital  mobility  is  changing  through  time. In  this  paper  we recognize  that  '  is
a  variable  coefficient  with  its  value  varying  with  the  degree  of  openness  in  the
capital  account. A similar  idea  was used  in Corbo  and  McNellis  (1989)  for  the
estimation  of price  equations  in  economies  where  the  degree  of openness  of the
trade  account  is  changing  during  the  period  of estimation.
To obtain  a measure  of the  effective  degree  of capital  mobility  for
Chile,  equation  (11')  is used to estimate  t  with quarterly  data from 1975 to
1983.
(ii)(i-  i  i-i  )  +  (  1 
Equation  (11')  is  estimated  with  two  different  methods:  time-varying  and  constant
coefficient.
26  Haque  and  Montiel  modify  their  specification  in  a  way  that  permits  t em
to apply  it  to countries  where  interest  rates  are  controlled  and  thus  there  is
no data  on the  domestic  market  clearing  interest  rate.35
Under  the  time-varying  coefficient  method,  the  coefficient  is assumed
to follow  the  process
,-  AN,l  +  Vt.  (12)
The constant  coefficient  method  may be viewed  as a special  case of the time-
varying method where A-1 and var(vt)=O.  In this paper, the time-varying
parameter  estimation  is  dor,e  using  the  Kalman  filter. 27
The  significance  of  the  variability  in  capital  mobility  can  be seen  in
figures  13  and  14  where  the  time-varying  coefficient  estimates,  the  OLS  estimate,
and  upper  and lower  bounds  for  the  OLS  estimate  (calculated  at 90% confidence
intervals,  based  on the  estimated  standard  error  and  the  critical  t-statistic)
are plotted.  If the Kalman-Filter  estimate  falls  outside  the upper  or lower
bounds,  then  the  variation  is  significantly  different  from  the  variation  one  may
tolerate  under  the  constant  coefficient  assumption.  The  pattern  that  4  follows
is  directly  related  to  the  relaxation  of restrictions  on  capital  inflows  (Corbo
1985a).  The large  drop In the  value of * after the second  quarter  of 1982
coincides  with a  period  in  which  capital  inflows  all  but  disappeared  following
the  domestic  crisis  and  the  international  debt  crisis.
27  In  order  to  proceed  with  time-varying  estimation,  the  Kalman  filter  must
be initialized. In the  absence  of a priori  knowledge,  OLS  estimates  of the  I,
var(Q) and var(() are used as Initial  estimates  of Wo,  var(* 0) and var(CO).
Lastly,  some  a  priori  assumption  must  be  made  about  the  initial  variation  of  the
innovation  to  the  coefficients  var(v,).  The  ime-varying  coefficients  are  very
sensitive  to the  initial  value  of this  innovation.  By theory,  9  is bounded  by
1 and  0.  The  restrictions  placed  on these  innovation  should  be such  that  this
restriction  is  met.  The initial  values  of the  innovation  to the  coefficients
is assumed  to be some  fraction  of the innovation  to the  observation  equation.
For estimation  purposes  we have  chosen  two  values  for  this  fraction,  0.001  and
0.0001. Values  larger  than  this  result  in  estimates  of  $  that  violate  the  above
theoretical  bounds.36
The  observed  and  estimated  domestic  interest  rates  obtained  from  the  two
methods  are shown  in figures  6 - 9.  As can be seen,  the time-varying  model
tracks  the  behavior  of  the  observed  domestic  interest  rate  quite  well  during  this
period. In  contrast,  the  OLS  estimiates  over-  predict  interest  rates  for  most  of
the  period. As  expected,  the  fit  is  much  better  using  the  black  market  exchange
rate of devaluation. The large  over-estimation  that occurs  after the first
quarter  of 1981  coincides  with  a period  when the  central  bank  began  to suggest
an interest  rat,e  to the  financial  system.
From  these  results, we  conclude  that up  to early  1978  damestic
interest  rates  were driven  mostly  by domestic  monetary  policy  and  only in the
second  half of 1978 did the  uncovered interest  parity interest rate become  more
important.
VII.  The Post 1984 Adjustment:  Real Devaluation  Without  Inflation
Acceleration  .
For  the  period  1984-1988  Chile  engineered  a  large  real  devaluation  that
reached  close  to 50  percent. During  the  same  period  the  public  sector  deficit,
including  an estimate  for the quasi-fiscal  deficit  of the Central  Bank,  was
reduced  from  9  percent  of GDP in  1984  to a surplus  of 3 percent  of GDP  in 1988
(see  Marshall  and Larrafaga,1989).  Following  the large  devaluation  of 1984,
inflation  increased  in  1985  reaching  30  percent  per  year  but  then  came  down  again
to  a level  close  to  20  percent  per  year. GDP  growth  slowed  down  in  1985  but  then
it  averaged  6.3  percent  per  year  in  the  period  1986-88  and  the  growth  rate  for
-' On  policies  during  this  period,  see  Arellano  (1988),  Fontaine  (1989)  and
Marshall  and  Larrafiaga  (1989).37
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1989 was around 10.0 percent (Table 1).  This growth was pulled by non-copper
exports that grew at an average rate of 13Z per year in the period 1986-88.
Real Depreciation and Inflation
We are interested  in  analyzing  how this  real  devaluation  and turn  around
of the  Chilean economy was achieved.  Different factors are important here.
First, Central Bank access to foreign  markets as part of the renegotiations on
the private sector debt.  Therefore, the large deficits associated with the
rescue  operation of troubled financial institutions stem=ing from the financial
crises of 1983 was not financed by printing money but by issuing foreign and
domestic interest-bearing liabilities of the central bank.  In fact, the public
sector deficit (including the quasi-deficit of the Central Bank) was running
close to 10 percent of GDP in 1985, non-monetary financing  was obtained by the
Treasury, tapering  domestic and external financial  markets.  As the initial  debt
of the public sector was very small and monetary policy was quite activist,
domestic real interest  rate did not  increase much.  External  financing was
obtained  from  commercial  banks  as  part  of  new  money  packages  and  from
multilateral  financial  institutions.  Further  reduction  in  government
expenditures and  quasi-fiscal subsidies stemming  from  the programs of subsidies
to debtors and preferential exchange rates by the Central Bank (ended  by 1986)
contributed to a drastic cut in the  non-financial public sector deficit turning
it to a  surplus of  around 3 percent  in 1988.  Therefore, the  large fiscal
adjustment made possible to obtain a significant real devaluation without a40
permanent  acceleration  in  inflation  in  spite  of  the  burden  imposed  on  the  central
bank  by the  solution  of the  financial  crises  of 1983  ".
A second  factor  that  contributed  to  the  non-inflationary  adjustment  in
relative  prices in Chile, in spite of a major real depreciation,  was the
combination  of  wage de-indexation  engineered  in 1982 and the persistence  of
considerable  unemployment  at least  until  1987.  In fact,  unlike  in some  other
Latin American countries, in Chile the authorities  did not  have to use
inflationary  acceleration  to erode  real  wages in  order  to  make them  consistent
with a  higher  real  exchange  rate.
A third  element  that contributed  to avoid an inflationary  spur from
adjustment  of  the  real  exchange  rate  and  the  external  accounts  was the  existence
of relatively  "low"  inflationary  expectations  as the public  internalized  a
rather  tough  fiscal  stance  by  the  authorities  aimed  to  prevent  a  return  to  higher
levels  of  inflation  in  spite  of  fiscal  difficulties.  In  other  words  a  reluctance
to use the inflation  tax (and  the  willingness  and political  ability  to cut
current  public  spending  even  in socially  sensitive  areas)  was perceived  by the
public,  giving  rise  to an anti-inflationary  bias  in the  system.
The previous  discussion  on how the sharp  real  depreciation  that took
place  in  the  Chilean  economy  after  1982  did  not  entail  a sustained  scceleration
in inflation  can be supported  econometrically  with a simple  accelerationist
specification  of inflation  run  for  both a  pre-1982  and  post-1982  sample  using
29  It could  be argued,  however,  that  the  large  internal  debt  accumulated
by  the  Central  Bank  in  Chile  constitute  a "latent"  inflationary  pressure  that  can
be triggt  ed if other  (than  printing  money)  sources  of revenues  of the  central
bank,  lik the  return  from  holdings  of  international  reserves,  transfers  from  the
treasury  or earnings from assets it acquired  during the intervention  of
financial  institutions  in 1983  deteriorate  (see  Solimano,  1990).41
quarterly  data. The  two  stages  least  squares  estimate  for  the  sample  1976.1  to
1982.2  30  yields  the  following  result  (t-statistics  under  parenthesis):
r  =  0.007 +  0.805 (g*_ +  _,  - _,)  +  1.11 f_
(0.47) (3.87)  (9.89)
R2 = 0.79  N  =  26
D.W. =  1.58  F-stat  45.27
log.likelihood=  42.47
The  two  stages  least  squares  estimates  for  the  period  1982.3  to  1989.1
yields  the  following  results:
r  =  0.027 +  0.178 (g.+  re  -X) +  0.368 r-,
(2.07) (0.99)  (1.47)
2=  0.13  N - 27
D.W  =  2.43  F-stat =  1.94
log.  likelihood  =  62.69
It is apparent  that a significant  change in the structure  of the
inflation  equation  has  taken  place  in  the  post  1982  period. On  the  one  hand,  the
degree of persistence  or inertia in the process of inflation is reduced
significantly  in the  period  post-1982  as cDmpared  to the pre-1982  period;  in
fact,  the coefficient  of r- is reduced  from (above)  the unity in the period
1976.1 to 1982.2 to a coefficient  0.368 in the period 1982.1 to 1989.1.
Undoubtedly  the  elimination  of the  clause  of full  lagged  wage indexation  since
the third  quarter  of 1982 goes a long  way explaining  this reduction  in price
inertia  for this period.  Another  major result,  and very important  for our
3  The  instrumertts  used  in  the  estimation  are :  the  constant  term,  the  rate
of  nominal  devaluation  lagged  one  period,  the  rate  of foreign  inflation  lagged
one  period,  the  rate  of domestic  inflation  lagged  two  periods.42
discussion,  is  the  sharp  reduction  in  the  coefficient  of  the  rate  of  depreciation
of  the  real  exchange  rate  in  the  inflation  equation. In fact,  the  elasticity  of
the  inflation  rate  with respect  to  the  rate  of  depreciation  of  the  real  exchange
rate  falls  from  0.80  in  the  period  1976.1  to  1982.2  to 0.17  in  the  period  1982.2
to 1989.1.  Indeed the  equation  captures well  the  large  reduction  in the
inflationary impact  of real  depreciation observed after  mid-1982 in the Chilean
economy.
Real Depreciation and Growth
The real depreciation has been one of the factors behind the recovery
and growth record of the post-1984 period.  In particular, we find that of non-
copper  exports  and  efficient import  competing  activities  responded  rapidly  to  the
new higher real exchange rate and a modest increase in tariffs that took place
after 1983.31 Concerning the new configuration of relative prices, it is also
worth mentioning that the policy of  maintaining a real interest rate compatible
with a reasonable rate of return for physical investment  was another important
element behind the recove:y of private investment and the resumption of growth
after  1984.32
Other factors behind the recovery cum growth process of the Chilean
economy after 1984 were:  (i) the large availability of labor and some unused
capacity until 1987, (ii) the economy  was with very few distortions (iii)  very
favorable copper prices in 1988-89, that provided  a cushion on the external
31  On the response of exports to the real exchange rate see Caballero and
Corbo (1989).
32  The interest  rate  po  cy represents  a departure  with the  extravagant
levels  of  the  real  interest  rat  s  observed  in  the  Chilean  economy  in  the  mid-and
late seventies  and the early eighties (particularly  in 1981).For  a further
discussion  of the sources  of growth  post  1984  in  Chile  see  Solimano,  1990.43
sector  and  improved  public  finances  (iv)  the  support  provided  by an increase  in
the share  of public  investment  in GDP after 1985  coupled  by a recovery  in
private  investment  starting  more forcefully  since  1987  (see  Solimano,1989b).
As a  final  observation  around  the  rather  strong  real  performance  of  the
Chilean  economy  after  the  crises  of  1982-83  we find  that  the  correction  of  major
misalignment  in key relative  prices  like  the real  exchange  rate  and the  real
interest  rate,  characteristic  of  the  early  1980s,  are  conditions  sine  qua-non  for
more structural  reforms  like  liberalization  of  the  trade  regimes,  the  reforms  in
industrial  organization  fostering  factor  mobility  and  domestic  competition  work
their  for  a  change  in  incentives  being  able  to  generate  a  rapid  and  strong  supply
responses.  The Chilean  experience  shows again that restoring  macroeconomic
balances,  the reduction  of major distortions  (and  a bit of good luck in the
external  sector,  say  in  copper  prices)  were  fundamental  conditions  for  restoring
growth  (see  Corbo  and  de  Melo,  1987).
Inflation  and  Real  Wages
An important  question  in  the  adjustment  process  followed  by the  Chilean
economy  after  1984  is the  impact  of the  real  depreciation  of the  exchange  rate
on real  wages.  A  trade-off  between  external  competitiveness  and standard  of
living  is  often  present  in  the  course  of  an  adjustment  process.  To  get  a  further
insight  between  the relationship  between  real  wages  and  the  real  exchange  rate
and  other  variables  like  labor  productivity,  terms  of  trade  and  spending  we will
set  up a simple  model following  Collins  and Park (1939)  and  Corbo (1985b)  of
determination  of the real  exchange  rate.44
The  model  is  constituted  by  the  following  equations:  First  a  definition
of the  real  exchange  rate,  R, as the  ratio  between  the  domestic  currency  price
of foreign  goods,  eP, and  the  price  of  domestic  goods,  P.  Say,
(1) R- eP/P
The  price  if  domestic  goods  will  be  a  linear  homogeneous  function  of  the
price  of exportable  goods,  P,,  the  price  of importable  goods,  P.,  and the  price
of non-traded  goods,  P^,
(2)  P=P(P,,P.,P)
In  turn  the  price  of exports  goods  will be  assumed  to  be a function  of
the  wage rate adjusted  by labor  productivity,  w/a,,  and the  price  of imported
intermediate  goods  in  domestic  currency,  P.
(3)  P,=  f(w/a,,P.)
The economy  will be assumed  to be a price taker for the goods it
imports:
(4)  P.=  eP.'
The  price  of home  goods  will  be determined  by  wages  adjusted  by labor
productivity in the home goods sector, w/a,, the price of imported inputs in
domestic  currency,  P.,  and  a the  ratio  of expenditure  over  real  output,  E/y.
(5) P,=  h(w/a,,  P.,  E/y)
Replacing equations (3)-(S) in (2) and inserting in the definition of
the  real  exchange  rate (1',  we get:
(6)  R  =  eP/P( f(w/a,,  eP.a),  eP*, h(w/a,,  eP.*,  E/y))
Rearranging  terms,  equation  (6)  can  be  written  as
(7)  R= R( e/w,  P'/P.',  a,,  a,,  E/y )
Equation  (7)  indicates  that  the  real  exchanE rate  depreciates  (R  rises)
with a  cut  in  real  wages  in  dollars  (an  increase  in  e/w),  a  deterioration  in  the45
external  terms  of  trade  and  an  increase  in  labor  productivity  in  export  and  home
goods  activities." In turn  the  real  exchange  rate  appreciates  (R  falls)  when
there  is an increase  in  domestic  spending  relative  to output.
The  semi-reduced  form  solution  of  the  model,  equation  (7),  is  estimated
econometrically  with quarterly  data for  the  1980s.1'  The results  for the  log-
linear  estimation  with  quarterly  data  for  the  period  1980.1  to 1989.1  yields: 13
ln(R) =  -1.153 +  0.237 ln(e/w)  +  0.129 ln(a,)  +  0.449 ln(a.)  +
(-0.96) (2.77)  (1.20)  (1.62)
+  0.117 ln(p.,/p,. 1 )  - 0.506 ln(E,/y_) +  0.916 ln(R1)
(1.20)  (-1.50)  (4.96)
- 0.337 ln(R- 2)
_ 2.15)
R 2- 0.93  n =  37
D.W. =  1.95  F-stat =  62.07
log. likelihood - 57.29
A  An increase  in labor  productivity  in  export  and  home goods  activities
(the  import  competing  sector  is  price  taker)  reduces  the  price  of  domestic  goods,
so  given  ep',  a real  depreciation  takes  place.
3  The equation  is estimated  by OLS  with the ratio  absorption  to output
lagged  one  period  to  avoid  a simultaneity  problem  with  the  contemporaneous  real
exchange  rate.
3  The  variables  were constructed  as follows:  the  real  exchange  rate,  R,
is the ratio of the index of foreign goods in the wholesale price index
multiplied  by the  nominal  exchange  rate  and  divided  by  the  consumer  price  index.
The ratio  e/w was constructed  dividing  the  nominal  exchange  rate by average
nominal  wages.  The  average  productivity  of  labor  in  exportables,  a,,  is  the  ratio
between  total  output  in  mining,  manufacturing  and  agriculture  divided  by total
employment  in  the  three  sectors.  The  average  labor  productivity  in  the  home  goods
sector,  a,,  is the  rdtio  of output  in services  and  other  non-traded  activities
to total employment  in that sectors.  The terms of trade Index,  p'/p'.,  is
approximated  by the  ratio  between  the  international  price  of c pper  divided  by
the  price  index  of  prices  of the  OECD  countries.  The  ratio  of  at,  orption  to  GDP,
E/y,  was constructed  as 1  minus  the  ratio  of the  trade  surplus  to  GDP.46
The  estimate  of  the  equation  for  the  real  exchange  rate  in  Chile  in  the
1980s reveals  some interesting  results.  First,  the elasticity  of the real
exchange  rate  with respect  to the  real  wage  in  dollars,  w/e,  is  - 0.23  a rather
low  number. This  finding  is  consistent  with  the  fact  that,  in  particular  after
1984, the initial drop in real wages  (even in dollar terms) associated with a
large real depreciation was  not too large -given the magnitude  of  the real
depreciation, around 45 percent in 1984-89.  Second, the ratio of absorption to
output  seems  to  have a considerable  quantitative  impact  on the  real exchange rate
namely the elasticity is - 0.506.  That, in turn,  provides support to the casual
observation that the implementation  of expenditure changing fiscal and  monetary
policies to support the real depreciation of the peso after mid-1982 played an
important role in achieving such a real depreciation in Chile in the post 1982
period.  Third, the size and significance  of the coefficient of the lagged real
exchange rates in the equation supports the  notion of a gradual approach of the
real  exchange rate to 'equilibrium  or at least sustainable  levels after changes
in fundamentals take place.
VIII. Conclusions and  Lessons from  the  Chilean  Experience: an  Overall  Assessment
The last 15 years of Chile's economic history provides some important
lessons on stabilization.  First, after the outburst of 'corrective inflation'
of the  last quarter of  1973  largely associated  to the  relaxation of price
controls under conditions of a large  money overhang, the experience of 1975-77
illustrates that the elimination of the fiscal deficit is a necessary but not a
sufficient condition for the control of inflation.  In economies with a  long
history  of inflation,  where credibility  problems  are at stake  and inde'ation
schemes  --  introduced de-facto or dejure --  are pervasive, a strong inertia is47
likely  to  exist and  that  makes  inflation  stabilization  very  costly  without  some
sort  of income  policies  that  solve  the  coordination  problem  implicit  in  guiding
individual  wage and  price  setters  to reach  a low-inflation  equilibrium.
Second,  if the  exchange  rate  is used  as an anchor  in a stabilization
program,  then  other  nominal  prices  should  be free  or fixed  with  reference  to  the
exchange  rate,  otherwise,  key relative  prices  such  as real exchange  rate,  the
real  wage rate  and  the  real  interest  rate  could  move into  unsustainable  paths,
making  the  macroeconomic  situation  unsustainable.  In sum  both  the  fiscal  shock
therapy  of 1975-77  and  the  experiment  with  exchange  rate-based  stabilization  of
1978-82  show  that  the  convergence  to a low  inflation  equilibrium  may  be a slow
process. Ergo,  the  dynamics  of  disinflation  matters  a great  deal  in the  design
of a stabilization  plan.
The two stabilization  episodes  just mentioned  highlight  neatly  the
potential  trade-offs  between  meeting  the  inflation  target  and  achieving  a real
exchange  rate  consistent  with  the  fundamentals  during  the  course  of  disinflation.
In the  period  1975-77  a real  depreciatirn  of the  exchange  rate  was required to
accommodate  lower  real  copper  prices  and  a  reform  of the  trade  regime. However,
the exchange  rate policy oriented  to produce  a real depreciation  conspired
against rapid disinflation,  making the trade-off  between achieving  a  real
devaluation  and attaining  the inflationary  target  more evident.  A similar
problem  arose  during  the  exchange  rate-based  stabilization  experiment  of  1978-82
when  the  use  of  the  exchange  rate  for  stabilization  purposes  after  February  1978,
in the context  of backward  wage indexation  and declining  inflation  led to an
overvaluation  of the  real  exchange  rate,  a large  increase  in expenditure  and  an
unsustainable  current  account  deficit. When lack  of  foreign  financing  forced  a
reduction  in  the  current  account  deficit,  expenditure  reducing  policies  resulted48
in a sharp  increase  in  unemployment.  Again the  inf.ationary  target  had to be
given-up  (transitorily)  and  the  exchange  rate  had  to  be  devalued  in  1982  in  order
to correct  the unemployment  that  was generated  from the expenditure  reducing
policies.
Another  important  issue  is the cost of stabilization. The cost of
stabilization  in the  program  of 1975,  in  terms  of cut  in real  wages  and  output
and  employment  losses,  were  certainly  high  and  the  strategy  was  apparently  to  pay
the costs upfront at the beginning of the program (a recently installed
authoritarian  regime  provided  some  of  the  background  for  that)  . In  the  exchange
rate-based  stabilization  program  the  costs  of stabilization  seemed  not to  exist
at the  beginning  as a boom  in  economic  activity  developed. However  the  crisis
of 1982-83  largely  associated  with  the  need to  correct  an  unsustainable  current
account  deficit that  had resulted  from  the  exchange  rate  policy  followed  in  the
preceding  period  of exchange  rate  based-stabilization  showed  that  the  costs  of
stabilization  did  not  disappear  but  were  just  postponed  toward  the  final  phase
of the  exchange  rate  based  stabilization  plan. Moreover  the size  of the  costs
of stabilization  (taking  the  form  of  a correction  of  a  current  account  deficit)
were indeed  large. This different  intertemporal  distribution  of the  costs  of
stabilization  across  different  prograr..s  (fiscal  shock  versus  exchange  rate  based
stabilization)  is  another  important  lesson  of the  Chilean  experience.
Finally,  the  post.  1984  experience  illustrates  the  importance  of  well  functioning
goods  markets,  (though  the  existence  of  high  unemployment,  although  being  reduced
at a relatively  rapid  pace,  shown  that  adjustment  in  the  labor  market  is often
more  cumbersome),  a competitive  real  exchange  rate,  the  restoring  of the  basic
macroeconomic  balances  -all  of  this  complemented  with favorable  terms  of trade-
were the  basic  conditions  for  restoring  non-inflationary  growth.49
REFERENCES
Arellano,  J.P.  (1988) 'Crisis  y Recuperaci6n  Econ6mica  en  Chile  en los  Afos
80"  Colecci6n  Estudios  Cieplan,  Junio.
Banco  Central  de Chile.  (1985). Indicadores  Econ6micos  y Sociales
1960-1985. [Economic  and  Social  Indicators  1960-1985].  Boletin  Mensual,
(various  issues).
BarandiarAn,  E.  (1977). wUna  Nota  Sobre  Politica  Cambiaria." Documento
No. 50,  Departamento  de Estudias  BHC.
Behrman,  J. R.  (1976). Foreign  Trade  Regimes  and  Economic  Development:  Chile.
New York:  Columbia  University  Press  for  NBER.
Bruno,  M., et al.  (1988). Inflation  and stabilization.  The  experience  of
Israel,  Argentina,  Brazil, Bolivia  and Mexico.  Cambridge,  Mass: MIT
Press.
_  , and S. Fischer.  (1986).  "The  Inflationary Process: Shocks and
Accommodations."  In Y. Ben-Porath  (ed.),  The Israeli  Economy:  Maturing
Through  Crisis. Cambridge,  Mass.  Harvard  University  Press.
Caballero,  R. and  V. Corbo (1989)  "  Real  Exchange  Rate  Uncertainty  and  Exports
:  Multi-country  Empirical  Evidence  "  World  Bank  Economic  Review,  May
Cauas,  J.  (1975). "The  Government  Economic  Recovery  Program." Reproduced  in
J.  C. Mendez,  Chilean  Economic  Policy  ,  Santiago,  Chile:  1979.
(1970). "Stabilization  Policy: the  Chilean  Case." Journal  of
Political  Economy,  Vol  78,  No.  4, Supplement  to July-August.
Corbo,  V.  (1982). "Monetary  Policy  with  an Overrestricted  Demand  for  Money
Equation:  Chile  in the  60's." Journal  of Development  Economics  10.
. (1985a).  "Reforms  and Macroeconomic AdjuEtments in Chile During
1974-84." World  Development,  Vol.  13,  No. 8.
. (1985b).  "International  Prices, Wages and Inflation in an Open
Economy:  a  Chilean  model." The  Review  of  Economics  and  Statistics.  Vol.
LXVII.
and P. Meller.  (1981).  "Alternative  Trade Strategies and
Employment  Implications:  Chile." In  A. 0. Krueger,  et al. (eds.),  Trade
and Employment  in Developing  Countries,  Vol. 1.  Individual  Studies.
Chicago,  Illinois:  Press  for  the  NBER.50
--------- and de Melo (1987) "  Lessons from the Southern Cone Policy Reforms,
World Bank Research Observer  July.
---------  and P. McNelis.  (1989).  "The Pricing of Manufactured Goods During
Trade Liberalization: Evidence from  Chile, Israel and Korea."  The Review
of Economic and Statistics.  Vol. LXXI
Cortazar, R.  (1983).  "Politicas  de Reajustes y Salarios en Chile: 1974-82."
Estudios Cieplan, Numero 10  (June).
ECLAC.  (1983).  'Balance Preliminar de la Economia de America Latina y el
Caribe.  1984."  [Preliminary  Balance of the  Economy of  Latin American and
the Caribbean.  1984].  Santiago, Chile.
Edwards, A.  (1985).  'Wage Indexation and Real Wages: Chile 1974-1980.'
Unpublished paper.  Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
Edwards, S.  (1986).  "Are  Devaluations Contractionary?"  Review of Economr.`cs
and Statistics, Vol. LXVIII.
and A. Edwards.  (1985).  Monetarism  and Liberalization:  the Chilean
Experiment.  Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger Press.
and M.  Khan.  (1985).  "Interest  Rate  Determination  in Developing
Countries."  IMF Staff Papers 32 (September).
Ffreinch-Davis,  R.  (1982).  "El  Experimento Monetarista en Chile: Una Sintesis
Critica."  [The Chilean  Monetarist  Experiment: A  Critical  Overview].
Estudios Ciep.an, Numero 9 (Diciembre).
Fischer, S.  (1988).  "Real Balances, the Exchange Rate and Indexation:
Real  Variables in  Disinflation."  Quarterly Journal  of Economics,  no. 103.
Fontaine, J. A.  (1989).  "The  Chilean Economy in the 1980s:  Adjustment and
Recovery."  In  S. Edwards and F. Larrain (eds.),  The  Debt Crisis.  London,
England: Blackwell.
Foxley, A.  (1981).  "Stabilization  Policies and Their  Effects in  Employment and
Income Distribution: a Latin  American Perspective."  In  W. R.  Cline and S.
Weintraub  (eds.),  Economic  Stabilization  in  Developing  Countries.
Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution.
Gotuzo, L.  (1973).  "Report or,  the State of Public Finance."  Reproduced in
J. C. Mendez (1379), op. c.t.
Haque, N.  Ul. and P.  Montiel.  (1989).  "Capital  Mobility in  Developing  Countries
--  Some  Empirical  Tests."  mimeo.51
Harberger,  A. C.  (1982). 'The  Chilean  Economy  in the  1970s:  Crisis,
Stabilization,  Liberalization,  Reform,'  K. Brunner  and A. M. Meltzer
(eds.), Economic Policy in a  World of  Change, (Carnegie-Rochester
Conference  Series  on Public  Policy,  Vol. 17).
Larrain,  M. (1989)  *  How the  1981-1983  Chilean  Banking  Crisis  was  Handled"
PPR  Working  Paper  I 300  The  World  Bank.
Marshall,  J. and  0. Larranaga. (1989). 'Politica  Fiscal  y Ajuste  en Chile."
[Fiscal  Policy  and  Adjustment  in  Chile  1982-88).  mimeo,  ECLAC.
Matte,  R. and  P. Rojas.  (1989). 'Evoluci6n  Reciente  del  Mercado  Monetario
y  Una  Estimaci6n  de  la  Demanda  por  Dinero  en  Chile.' [Recent  Evolution  of
the  Monetary  Market  and  an  Estimation  of the  Demand  for  Money  in  Chile].
Cuadernos  de Economia,  August.
Mendez,  J. C. (ed.). (1979). Chilean  Economic  Policies. Santiago,  Chile:
Budget Office.
Kiguel,  M., and  N.  Liviatan.  (1988). "Inflationary  Rigidities and  Stabilization
Policies,'  The World Bank Economic Review.
Lagos, F., and A. Galetovic (1989).  'Inflacifn  e Indexaci6n en la Economia
Chilena.'  [Inflation  and Indexation  in the Chilean  Economy).  Paper
presented at  the IX Congreso Latinoamericano  Sociedad Econometrica,
Santiago, Chile.
Ramos, J.  (1980).  'The Economics of Hyperstagflation.  Stabilization Policy
in Post-1973 Chile."  The Journal of Development Economics 7.
S.iaastad,  L. and H. Cortes.  (1978).  'The  Monetary Approach to the Balance of
Payments  and Real Interest Rates in  Chile."  Estudios de Economia, No. 11.
Solimano, A. (1986).  'Contractionary  Devaluation in the Southern Cone.  The
Case of Chile.'  Journal of Development Economics, 23.
_  (1988).  "Politicas  de Remuneraciones  en Chile:  Experiencia
Pasada, Instrumentos y Opciones a  Futuro,"  [Wage Policies  in Chile:
Experience, Instruments and Future Options].  Colecci6n Estudios Cieplan
(Diciembre).
_  _.  (1989  a).  "Inflation  and  the Costs  of  Stabilization:  Country
Experiences, Conceptual Issues and Policy LEssons,'  PPR Working Paper
226,  The World Bank (also  forthcoming in  The  World Bank Research Observer,
June 1990).
. (1989 b).  "  Hou Private  Investment  Reacts  to Changing  Macroeconomic
Conditions. The Case of Chile in the 1980s' PPR Working Paper 1 212  The
World Bank.52
-----------  (1990) 'Economic  Growth, Social  Equity and  Macroeconomic Stability.
Looking at the Challenges for the Chilean Economy in the 1990s'. Paper
presented in the UNU/WIDER conference on 'Medium  Term Growth Strategies'
held in Stockholm, Sweden on April 1990.
Torres, C.  (1982).  'Evoluci6n  de la Politica Aranceleria: Periodo 1973-
1981.'  [Evolution of the Tariff Policy:  1973-1981].  Report No. 16,
Research Department, Central Bank of Chile.
Wallich,  H.  (1955).  Mainspr.r_rs  of the  German Revival  New  Haven: Yale  University
Yarez, J.  (1979).  'Una  Correcci6n del Indice de Precios al Consumidor Durante
el Periodo 1971-73.'  (A  Correction  to the Consumer Price Index During the
Period  1971-73).  Comentarios  Sobre  La  Situacion  Econ6mica,  Second
Semester, Santiago, Chile: Universidad de Chile.
Zahler, R.  (1983).  'Recent  Southern Cone Liberalization Reforms and
Stabilization  Policies,  the  Chilean  Case,  1974-82.'  Journal  of
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 25, No.N4.P.REL  Wo  cr P.pe  r S  C  s
Contact
Thle  A  Dilte  for paper
WPS554  Korea's Labor Markets Under  D c:it  Mr  mca  December 1990  M. Schreier
Structural Adjuctment  36432
WPS555  The Macroeconomics of Price Reform  S - c  C:  '-  .Ec  Decemnber  1990  0. del Cid
in Socialist Countries: A Dynamic  F:or z cO  CoV  ce'i  39050
Framework
WPS556  Taxing Choices in Deficit Reduct on  Jc' n Ba'r&s  Decemnber  1990  A. Bhalla
Anwa  r S  >  -n  37699
WPS557  The New Fiscal Federalism in Brazl  A-gar  S-a:n  December 1990  A. Bhalla
37699
WPS558  Alternative Instruments for  Kcrsne:, `.1 K.tCzer  December 1990  J. Carroll
Smoothing the Consumption of  Dav a '.i  Ne,  obery  33715
Primary Commodity Exporters  B' a" D  W-'  .g"
WPS559  Fiscal Policy and Private Investment  A;ay C  -e  bcec  December 1990  D. Bilkiss
in Developir,g Countries:  Recent  .1:anscc'  D.  ann  33768
Evidence on Key Selected Issues
WPS560  The Persistence of Job Security in  M.1 .'cc  ,r  Decemnber  1990  CECSE
Reforming Socialist Econornies  37188
WPS561  The Labor M.a'ket  and the Tra-s  .o  V.  :;.  D.e'raer  1990  CECSE
oi Social st Econom es  37188
WPS562  Anticipated Real Exchange-Rate  I...  . Dec-e-tber 1990  S. Jo'rnakuty
Changes and the Dynam:cs of  39076
Investment
WPS563  Ermpirical :nvestment  Eouatcrns  ^  I  -R  Dece" ber 1990  E. Khine
Developing Countries  39361
WPS564 Costs  and Benef:ts  of Agr  cu-  tt-'a.  A"  December 1990  C  Spooner
Price  Stabilkzat on  in Brazil  Ra.  K  .".  30464
A-  - c S.  ...  P  E-  c
P.1c._ cte  RP-ze-c.,  L.ccs
A~'ea::c:  a Ta'-
WPS565  Issues in Socialist Economy  S!tc-ey  F scher  December 1990  CECSE
Reform  A a  Gce  b  37188
WPS566  Measuring Outward Orientation in  La':  Pr !c' e!!  Jar-ary  1991  K. Cabana
Developing Countrles: Can It Be Done?  37947
WPS567  Macroeconomic Management anc tt e  A--  s  N  ' -'  "aJ.1-  ry 199t  A. Bhaila
Division of Powers in Brazil  A  c' I  . 37,699
Perspectives for the NinetiesPRE Working  Paper Seniea
Contact
AuLtDort  foro  paer
WPS563  H gher Waqes for Relief Work Can  Martin Ravallion  January 1991  C. Spooner
Make Many of the Poor Worse Off:  Gaurav Datt  30464
Recent Ev dence from Maharashtra's  Shubham Chaudhuri
`Emrp:oyme-t Guarantee Scheme"
WVPS5^9 Do-nest c Pu,chase Requ,rements for  Wendy E. Takacs  January 1991  S. Fallon
rnport  cenrse  Alrocations in Mali  37947
WPS570  Debt Corcentration  and Secondary  Raquel Fernandez  January 1991  S. King-Watson
Markel  Pr ces  Sule Ozler  31047
WPS5-'  Credit's Effect on Productivity in  Gershon Feder  January 1991  C. Spooner
Chinese Agricuiture:  A  Lawrence J. Lau  30464
M croeconom c Mode: of  Justin Y. Lin
D sec,  Dr  . rn  Xlaopeng  Luo
WPS5;'2  CQ-i;a  Positrons of Japanese  Edward J. Kane  January 1991  S. King-Watson
B a^ss  Haluk Unal  33730
Asli Demirguc-Kunt
V  SP  S  MOnlvyS  a-  Laboo MarKets  Undor  Dtpak Mazumdar  January 1991  M. Schreier
S-  Aac  r-  e-rt  36432
P.,.  ,.r.;  . c  c  :r- a S  r.  in  Vttoro  Coro  January 1991  S. Jonnakuty
.K'ais Schm dt-Hebbel  39u74
ffdc-;.  .t'CSa.  D  e  eve  op-rg  K aus Sc&midt-Hebbel  January 1991  E. Khine
F 'S' Cross-Country  Steven B. Webb  39361
,  v.e  ce  C-  Giancaio  Corsetti
.u  '  '  i  -'  -.''-S  T  eX  'c'r':  Wayne Thirsk  January 1991  A. Bhalla
V.  37699
Vh3-'  F  A.'P-g  In; a' n  Causes,  Ajay Chh  bber
'a-. C,res
^Vt  .'t'  >r  7  e,I-  U4pse  cl Tecenical  Beatrice Buyck  January  1991  E. Madrona
A  q!a-ce  'or  Irst  :utonal  37496
L ewr ),-ren  t
WPS5,7  Ch  e's  '  xper ence with Stabilization  Vittorio Corbo  January 1991  E. Khine
Rev s ted  Andres Solimano  39361
WPS5t.'  Do Na:>'al  ResOL.ce-Based  Alexander J. Yeats  January 1991  J. Jacobson
I  c-s'C  z3  Z  -o  SIrrveg  es Convee  33710
I'mrort!rt  (UriU'con-  zeO)  Price
C'a  Co-  rSoc,ty.Exoort,ng
ccz8f  ";q u  cr..~d *S 